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Abstract 
The term "metamemory" is used to describe one's knowledge and understanding of one's own 
memory. Research into metamemory has generally neglected actions in favor of verbal materials. 
In the few action metamemory studies published though, an interesting trend has emerged. In 
general, predictions of recall appear to be less accurate for subject-performed-tasks (SPTs) than 
for experimenter-performed tasks (EPTs) or verbal tasks (VTs). The present study seeks to 
determine whether or not these differences persist using a within-subjects design. Results 
showed that judgments of learning (JOLs) were higher for SPTs than EPTs or VTs, but actual 
recall did not differ across these conditions. Additionally, JOLs were positively correlated with 
actual recall for EPTs, but not SPTs or VTs. Future studies should look to demonstrate the 
enactment effect (better recall for SPTs than EPTs or VTs) through the use of list-end JOLs, 
which may help eliminate strengthened encoding across all conditions and/or distraction during 
encoding.   
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Metamemory for Performed and Observed Actions: Within-Subjects 
 Metamemory, a type of metacognition dealing with the knowledge and monitoring of 
one's own memory, has meaningful implications for how individuals learn new material. When a 
student studies for an exam, success or failure can hinge on how effectively and efficiently that 
student masters new material. Metamemory plays a major role in how students allocate study 
time, as students typically wish to devote more time to material that they do not feel they have a 
solid grasp of, and less time to material they think they already know. For these reasons, it is 
important to study how accurate and reliable metamemory is, and to determine when we can trust 
our own assessments of our memory versus when it is appropriate to have doubt. Rather than 
looking to study metamemory across all contexts though, we must make a distinction between 
metamemory for words and metamemory for actions to accommodate forms of learning (e.g., 
trade school education) that depend more on action-oriented tasks rather than text-based 
materials. 
 Ronald L. Cohen first demonstrated a difference between metamemory for words and 
metamemory for actions in his 1983 study entitled, "The effect of encoding variables on the free 
recall of words and action events." This study compared metamemory for words and actions by 
presenting participants with either lists of words or lists of action phrases to be acted out. Some 
of the action phrases (e.g., "Break the toothpick") required the use of an object, and for these 
phrases, the relevant object was hidden from the participants' view both before and after the 
action was carried out. Action phrases were acted out either by the participant (subject-
performed tasks, or SPTs) or by the experimenter (experimenter performed tasks, or EPTs). 
Following the presentation of a word or a completed action, the participant was asked to rate 
how likely they felt they were to recall the word or action on a later memory test. For these 
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ratings, the study used a scale ranging from +2 (Fairly sure the item would be recalled) to -2 
(Fairly sure the item would not be recalled) (Cohen, 1983). 
 Results indicated that metamemory for words is different in relative accuracy, or 
resolution, from metamemory for actions. It is important to note here that this and the following 
studies will be primarily concerned with the item-by-item measure of accuracy that resolution 
refers to, as opposed to absolute accuracy, or calibration. While individuals recalled both words 
and actions relatively well, the proportion of recalled actions that were not predicted to be 
recalled was significantly higher than that of words. In other words, metamemory for actions was 
worse than that for words because participants often failed to accurately predict that they would 
be able to recall the actions later. This phenomenon was more pronounced in SPTs than in EPTs, 
but in both cases, participants were far more pessimistic in their predictions of recall than they 
were in the word conditions (Cohen, 1983). This study helps to demonstrate that metamemory 
for words and metamemory for actions should be studied separately, because it shows that there 
are differences between the two with regards to the relative accuracy of our feelings about our 
memories. 
 In a 1988 study by Cohen, predicted recall was again worse for SPTs than for words. The 
first experiment of this study used a similar procedure to Cohen's 1983 work, but this time words 
were divided into concrete and abstract lists. Thus, in the word condition, the lists of words 
presented to participants were half concrete words and half abstract words. Additionally, in the 
SPT condition, half of the actions required objects and the other half did not. Participants were 
again instructed to rate how likely they would be to recall the word or action on a later memory 
test after each presentation, but this study used a scale ranging from 1 (This word/task is too 
weak in my memory to recall it) to 4 (This word/task is strong enough in my memory so I will be 
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able to recall it). Results showed that for both concrete and abstract words, predicted recall and 
actual recall were well aligned, while for SPTs, they were not. That is, actual recall was 
significantly positively correlated to predicted recall for both abstract and concrete words. For 
SPTs though, this study found no significant correlation between predicted and actual recall 
(Cohen, 1988). These results agree with Cohen's 1983 study, as participants did have some 
insight directly after acquisition as to what words they would recall later, but the same could not 
be said for performed actions. 
 A second experiment in Cohen's 1988 study looked into participants' abilities to judge 
memory trace strength for SPTs in comparison to words. This experiment used two 
manipulations. The first was a frequency manipulation, in which words or actions were presented 
to participants either once or twice. The second was a divided-attention manipulation, in which 
participants were either instructed to count backwards by threes during presentation, or were not 
instructed to do anything other than to attend to the presentation. In general, the procedure was 
the same as in the previous two experiments, with participants giving ratings of predicted recall 
shortly after acquisition. As hypothesized, better actual recall was seen for both words and 
actions that were presented twice, as well as for those presented in the absence of counting. In 
each of these cases, predicted recall mirrored actual recall. These results differ somewhat from 
those of these previous two, because in the multiple presentations and non-counting conditions, 
predictions of recall and actual recall were well aligned for SPTs for the first time in Cohen's 
research. An important implication of this finding is that people do not just generally have better 
insight into their memory of words than actions in all situations, because there are some 
situations in which recall prediction for SPTs can be accurate. A possible explanation given for 
our mostly poor recall predictions for actions has to do with a mismatch between the 
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characteristics of SPTs we use for trace strength ratings and those used in the actual recall of the 
actions, but this result indicates that these characteristics can at least sometimes be aligned 
(Cohen, 1988). 
 In 1991, Cohen and Bryant conducted a study that shed more light on the functioning of 
metamemory for actions with regards to different action types. In this study, participants 
performed actions that were either short (5 seconds) or long (30 seconds) in duration. In the long 
duration condition, the actions were either repetitive (e.g., "Bounce a ball several times") or non-
repetitive (e.g., "Stand up, walk around the room, open the door, look out, close the door, sit 
down"). After the completion of each of these actions, participants rated how likely they thought 
they were to recall the actions on a later memory test on a scale ranging from 1 (I am sure I will 
not recall this item) to 4 (I am sure I will recall this item). The study used lenient scoring criteria, 
such that the recall of any action in the sequence of non-repetitive tasks was equivalent to the 
recall of a repetitive action. This type of scoring compensated for the fact that it would be 
inherently more difficult to recall a list of different tasks than a single repeated one, and 
participants were informed of this scoring rule before making their recall predictions (Cohen & 
Bryant, 1991). 
 The results of this study showed that the longer duration actions were recalled at a 
significantly higher rate than the shorter duration actions, with predictions of recall mirroring 
actual recall. However, there was no significant difference in either predicted or actual recall 
between repetitive and non-repetitive actions. This study did well to build off of the previous two 
because it showed that participants could not accurately predict which short SPTs they would be 
able to recall, as there was no significant difference between the mean prediction ratings of 
recalled and non-recalled short SPTs. In addition, the same finding held true for long SPTs (no 
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significant difference in prediction ratings between those recalled and those not recalled). These 
results provide support for the idea that metamemory for actions is sensitive to quantitative, but 
not qualitative, encoding differences. Participants were convinced that they would be able to 
better recall the longer actions as opposed to the shorter ones, and it did not matter whether these 
actions were repetitive or not (Cohen & Bryant, 1991). 
 A second 1991 study by Cohen, Sandler, and Keglevich used three experiments to look at 
differences between predicted and actual recall of words and SPTs. These experiments used a 
study/test/test procedure in which participants studied a list of words or performed a list of 
actions and then completed an initial recall test, followed by a final recall test after each of three 
lists has been completed. Results from the first experiment showed that recall predictions were 
not accurate on the initial recall tests for SPTs, but were accurate for words. Also of note here is 
that initially recalled items, including items that received high and low ratings of predicted recall, 
were mnemonically similar. This suggests that the metamemory errors made were genuine (i.e., 
reflecting differences between encoding strength and subjective recall predictions) as opposed to 
being pseudo-errors (i.e., reflecting differences between encoding strength and probability of 
recall) (Cohen, Sandler, & Keglevich, 1991).  
 In the second experiment of this study, participants made their recall predictions during 
the initial testing phase as opposed to the study phase. The researchers reasoned that due to the 
similarity of the context between the initial recall test and the final test, predictions made during 
the initial test would be even stronger predictors of actual performance than predictions made 
during study (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989). However, this hypothesis was 
not supported, as the predictions made during initial recall in this experiment were not more 
accurate than those made during the testing phase of the first experiment. The third experiment 
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was a combination of the first two, where participants made predictions during both the testing 
phase and the initial recall phase. Results of this experiment mirrored the results of Experiment 1, 
and support the idea that this outcome is due to genuine metamemory errors as opposed to 
pseudo-errors (Cohen et al., 1991). 
 A later study investigated the effects of age on predicted and actual recall of words and 
SPTs by using lists of SPTs, verb-noun word pairs, and nonsense word pairs (McDonald-
Miszczak, Hubley, & Hultsch, 1996). Choosing these three list types varied the difficulty of 
encoding such that the effects of age on metamemory could be more clearly compared between 
more and less mentally taxing tasks. To compose two age groups in the study, 36 adults ranging 
from 19 to 28 years of age were recruited for the younger group, and 36 adults ranging from 60-
81 years of age were recruited for the older group. Results showed that differences in both 
predictions of recall and recall performance were the smallest between age groups for SPTs 
compared to verb-noun pairs and nonsense word pairs. The nonsense word pairs, which had the 
most flexible encoding possibilities (i.e., could be encoded in the most different ways), showed 
the highest item-by-item prediction accuracy. This finding suggests that the evaluation of one's 
own memory might be determined more by the characteristics of what is being encoded as 
opposed to simply being verbal or nonverbal in nature (McDonald-Miszczak et al., 1996). 
 Based off of these studies, it is evident that people usually cannot accurately assess how 
well they will remember actions they perform. Predictions of future recall (judgments of learning, 
or JOLs) for SPTs have continuously been shown as unreliable. This is a surprising result, as in 
Cohen's 1983 study and many others, participants demonstrated that they are generally fairly 
accurate when it comes to making JOLs for verbal materials. It also poses a problem, as the vast 
majority of research into metamemory up to this point has used words and verbal materials, 
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largely disregarding actions. These results demonstrate that metamemory for actions needs more 
attention in the field, and that results from studies only examining metamemory for words and 
verbal materials may not easily generalize to performed tasks. People seem to use different 
criteria for predicting their recall of actions as opposed to words, as demonstrated by the striking 
differences in relative accuracy between them. Because of these differences, it is difficult to 
make the case that all metamemory is the same, and future research should be designed to reflect 
these conclusions. 
 There has been no previous research looking into how judgments of learning (JOLs) for 
subject-performed tasks (SPTs) and experimenter-performed tasks (EPTs) are affected when a 
single subject is asked to both perform and observe actions in the same trial run. In the present 
study, we examine how JOLs and actual recall differ between SPTs and EPTs using a within-
subjects design. We hypothesize that SPTs will be recalled at a significantly higher rate than 
EPTs, as this enactment effect has been consistently demonstrated in prior studies. We are also 
investigating how JOLs will differ between SPTs and EPTs, if participants will clearly show that 
they believe they will be able to recall performed actions better or vice-versa, and how accurate 
their predictions will be overall. 
 Experiment 1: Method 
Participants 
 A total of 32 participants completed this study, all of whom were undergraduate students 
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Participants each received 0.5 hours of credit 
towards their completion of participant pool requirements for an introductory psychology course. 
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Design and Materials 
 Encoding condition (SPT v. EPT) was manipulated within subjects. A total of 36 action 
phrases prompted participants to either carry out or observe the actions described. These tasks 
were based on those used in Peterson and Mulligan (2010) and Hornstein and Mulligan (2004) 
(see Appendix). One list was constructed which included all of the actions in a random order. All 
action phrases required the use of an object (e.g., "Fold the index card," "Remove a piece of 
tape"), and no verb or object was repeated among the 36 phrases. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two versions of the study list. Both used the same set of actions in the same 
order, but in the first condition, half of the actions were randomly chosen to be SPTs and the 
other half EPTs, and in the second condition, the SPT and EPT assignments were reversed. 
Procedure 
 At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed that they would see or 
perform a series of simple actions which they would later be asked to recall. Participants were 
also informed that they would be asked to predict whether or not they would remember each 
action on the later test. Each participant sat at a table across from the experimenter, and half of 
the table and the area behind it were screened from the participant's view. The objects required 
for the actions were behind the screens. For each trial, the experimenter removed the relevant 
object from behind one of the screens and placed it on the table. Next, an action phrase was 
presented over the computer speakers. The experimenter then said either "Enact" or "Observe" 
based on whether the condition dictated that the action was to be an SPT or an EPT. If the 
experimenter said "Enact," the participant carried out the action in six seconds. If the 
experimenter said "Observe," the participant watched as the experimenter carried out the action 
in six seconds. After the six seconds were up, the experimenter took the object back and placed it 
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behind a screen, out of the participant's view. After observing or enacting an action, the 
participant rated how confident he or she was that he or she would be able to recall the action 
phrase on a later memory test on a scale of 0 (Not confident at all) to 100 (Extremely confident). 
After the participant gave a JOL, the next trial began. 
 At the conclusion of all 36 study trials, the participant was informed that there would be a 
mental arithmetic task. In this task, the participant was presented with a sheet of math problems 
and was asked to solve as many problems as possible in three minutes. Problems included 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Participants were informed that they could 
skip over whichever questions they wanted and return to them later if time allowed. This was 
designed as a distracter task, and no participant was able to finish all of the problems within the 
allotted time. 
 After the distracter task, the recall test was administered. The participant was given a 
sheet of paper and instructed to write down as many of the action phrases as he or she could 
recall in any desired order. The importance of recalling the entire action phrase in its original 
wording was stressed to the participant, and the participant was told to recall as much of the 
phrase as possible if he or she could not recall it in its entirety. Participants were informed that 
they would be given five minutes for the recall test, but some participants did not use all of the 
allotted time. 
Data Analysis 
 Responses on the recall test were scored according to both lenient and strict grading 
criteria. For recall to be scored as correct using lenient grading, either the action or the object of 
the action phrase needed to be recalled correctly (e.g., "Remove the lid" would be scored correct 
for "Twist off the lid"; "Flip the token" would be scored correct for "Flip the coin"). For recall to 
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be scored as correct using strict grading, both the action and the object of the action phrase 
needed to be exactly correct. In cases where the entire subject of a phrase was not correct (e.g., 
"Fold the card" rather than "Fold the index card," or "Insert the tack" rather than "Insert the 
thumb tack"), recall was not scored as strictly correct. However, when responses added words in 
to the phrases (e.g., "Push the toy car" rather than "Push the car") but the subject and verb were 
still both exactly correct, recall was scored as strictly correct. To control for primacy and recency 
effects, recall and predictions for the first and last two action phrases in the list of 36 were 
excluded from data analyses. 
Experiment 1: Results 
 Paired-samples t-tests were used to compare judgments of learning (JOLs) for subject-
performed tasks (SPTs) and experimenter-performed tasks (EPTs), as well as to compare actual 
recall for SPTs and EPTs according to both the lenient and strict grading criteria. Using strict 
grading criteria, out of 16 total items, SPTs (M = 5.13, SD = 1.88) were recalled slightly better 
than EPTs (M = 4.91, SD = 2.23), but the difference was not significant, t(31) = 0.46, p = .65. 
Using lenient grading criteria, SPTs (M = 8.09, SD = 2.28) were again shown to be recalled 
slightly better than EPTs (M = 7.50, SD = 2.23), but the difference was also not significant, t(31) 
= 1.23, p = .23. However, JOLs made for SPTs (M = 79.67, SD = 16.03) were significantly 
greater than those made for EPTs (M = 76.43, SD = 18.64), t(31) = 3.69, p = .001. 
 To assess the relationship between recall predictions and actual recall, we computed 
gamma correlations item-by-item for both SPTs and EPTs using both the lenient and strict 
grading criteria. These correlations provide a measure of the relationship between prediction and   
recall for each action phrase, with values near 0 indicating inaccurate prediction and values near 
1 indicating accurate prediction. We then used these correlations to compute one-sample t-tests 
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to compare the overall means of the correlations to zero, which determined whether or not the 
correlations were statistically significant. That is, correlations greater than zero indicate at least 
some relative accuracy of the memory predictions. We also computed paired-samples t-tests to 
compare the correlations between SPTs and EPTs, which determined whether or not these 
correlations were significantly different from each other.  
 Means of the gamma correlations varied slightly between the one-sample t-tests and the 
paired-samples t-tests because gamma could not be computed for some subjects. In cases where 
subjects give the same JOL for every item in a condition or have the same recall for every item 
in a condition (whether it be the case that he or she recalled every item or failed to recall every 
item), gamma cannot be computed. For some subjects, gamma may be computed for one 
condition, but not the other. Data from these subjects are able to be included in the one-sample t-
test for the condition that their gamma could be computed, but not in the one-sample t-test for the 
other condition (i.e., for SPTs but not EPTs, or vice-versa). However, as these subjects do not 
have valid gamma correlations for both conditions, there is no way to include them in the paired-
samples t-test. In this study, there were 31 subjects with a valid gamma for the SPT condition, 31 
subjects with a valid gamma for the EPT condition, and 30 subjects with a valid gamma for both. 
 For strictly graded data used in the one-sample t-tests, the gamma correlations of recall 
prediction and actual recall were larger on average for EPTs (M = 0.21, SD = 0.53) than for SPTs 
(M = -0.07, SD = 0.48). A one-sample t-test showed that mean correlations were significant for 
EPTs graded strictly, t(30) = 2.22, p = .03. Mean correlations for SPTs were not significant after 
strict grading, t(30) = -0.80, p = .43. For strictly graded data used in the paired-samples t-tests, 
the gamma correlations of recall prediction and actual recall were again larger on average for 
EPTs (M = 0.18, SD = 0.51) than for SPTs (M = -0.10, SD = 0.46). The result of a paired-
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samples t-test comparing these mean gamma correlations between SPTs and EPTs using strict 
grading was significant, t(29) = 2.75, p = .01. 
 For leniently graded data used in the one-sample t-tests, the gamma correlations of recall 
prediction and actual recall were also larger on average for EPTs (M = 0.18, SD = 0.43) than for 
SPTs (M = 0.03, SD = 0.42). A one-sample t-test showed that mean correlations were also 
significant for EPTs graded leniently, t(30) = 2.30, p = .03. As was the case for strict grading, 
mean correlations for SPTs were not significant for lenient grading, t(30) = 0.39, p = .70. For 
leniently graded data used in the paired-samples t-tests, the gamma correlations of recall 
prediction and actual recall were again larger on average for EPTs (M = 0.15, SD = 0.41) than for 
SPTs (M = 0.001, SD = 0.40). However, the result of a paired-samples t-test comparing these 
mean gamma correlations between SPTs and EPTs was not significant with lenient grading, t(29) 
= 1.43, p = .16. Therefore, the only difference of statistical significance between strict and 
lenient grading was this paired-samples t-test, where strict grading showed a significant 
difference in gamma correlations whereas lenient grading did not. 
Experiment 1: Discussion 
 While the above results will be more carefully scrutinized in the General Discussion, it is 
important to note some of the major trends seen in these data. For Experiment 1, we will use the 
results from strict grading to interpret the data. As previously stated, the only difference between 
strict and lenient grading was in the paired-samples t-test on the gamma correlations, in which 
strict grading resulted in a significant difference whereas lenient grading did not. However, 
results from lenient grading were trending towards significance (p = .16), so the most likely 
explanation for this finding was a lack of power. That is to say, with more participants in the 
METAMEMORY FOR PERFORMED AND OBSERVED ACTIONS 16 
study, we would expect this result to become significant. In addition, there is no precedent with 
regards to standardized grading criteria in the published literature reviewed earlier. 
 Participants in Experiment 1 did not recall their performed actions significantly better 
than observed ones. However, they did demonstrate (through a significant difference in JOLs) 
that they believed they would be able to recall performed actions better than observed ones. 
Additionally, participants had some accurate insight into their memory for EPTs but not for SPTs, 
as mean correlations of prediction and actual recall were significantly greater than zero only in 
the former condition. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the encoding of actions 
produces less insight into memory than other forms of encoding, and was found with a stronger 
control condition (EPTs) than prior work. However, it is concerning that participants failed to 
exhibit the well-documented enactment effect (higher recall for performed than observed 
actions).  
 A follow-up experiment is needed for a few reasons. First, it is necessary examine if 
these results remain the same when using a more traditional action memory control (verbal tasks, 
or VTs). Second, because item-by-item JOLs can eliminate encoding effects, and because 
comparing actual recall between SPTs and VTs usually produces larger recall differences, this 
experiment makes finding an enactment effect more likely than it was in Experiment 1.  Third, it 
will assess the possibility that the lack of an enactment effect in Experiment 1 resulted from the 
particular action phrases used.  
Experiment 2: Introduction 
 It is possible that the lack of an enactment effect in Experiment 1 resulted from the 
particular action phrases we chose for the experiment, as this exact list of action phrases has only 
been used in one other study. In the study, the enactment effect was also not found, but this can 
METAMEMORY FOR PERFORMED AND OBSERVED ACTIONS 17 
likely be explained by the study's between-subjects design, in which the enactment effect is 
typically weaker (Jin, 2015). Experiment 2 will use the same within-subjects design as 
Experiment 1, but will look at recall and prediction differences between subject-performed tasks 
(SPTs) and verbal tasks (VTs) rather than differences between SPTs and experimenter-
performed tasks (EPTs). The enactment effect is typically larger in comparisons between SPTs 
and VTs than between SPTs and EPTs, so if there are no anomalies with the particular action 
phrases in these experiments, the enactment effect should appear. Experiment 2 is still in 
progress, however, so the full data set is not yet available. 
Experiment 2: Method 
Participants 
 A total of six participants have completed the experiment to this point, all of whom were 
undergraduate students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Participants each 
received 0.5 hours of credit towards their completion of participant pool requirements for an 
introductory psychology course. 
Design and Materials 
 Encoding condition was again manipulated within subjects. The only change from 
Experiment 1 was the substitution of the VT condition for the EPT condition; all of the action 
phrases remained the same. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as Experiment 1 except for the replacement of EPT trials 
with VT trials. In these new trials, an action phrase was again presented over the computer 
speakers. Next, the experimenter removed the relevant object from behind one of the screens and 
placed it on the table. The experimenter then instructed the participant to "Listen," and in 
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response, the participant simply looked at the object for the six-second period. After the six 
seconds were up, the experimenter took the object back and placed it behind a screen, out of the 
participant's view. The participant then gave a JOL, and the next trial began. 
Data Analysis 
 There were no changes made to the data analysis plan followed for Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2: Results 
 Using strict grading criteria, SPTs (M = 5.33, SD = 1.75) were recalled slightly better 
than VTs (M = 3.33, SD = 2.07), but the difference was not significant, t(5) = 2.36, p = .067. 
Using lenient grading criteria, SPTs (M = 8.50, SD = 2.74) were again shown to be recalled 
slightly better than VTs (M = 6.83, SD = 1.47), but the difference was also not significant, t(5) = 
1.19, p = .29. However, JOLs made for SPTs (M = 85.50, SD = 16.74) were significantly greater 
than those made for VTs (M = 80.49, SD = 17.64), t(5) = 2.80, p = .04. 
 For strictly graded data used in the one-sample and paired-samples t-tests, the gamma 
correlations of recall prediction and actual recall were larger on average for VTs (M = -0.09, SD 
= 0.49) than for SPTs (M = -0.17, SD = 0.45). A one-sample t-test showed that mean correlations 
were not significant for VTs, t(5) = -0.45, p = .67, or SPTs, t(5) = -0.90, p = .41, graded strictly. 
The result of a paired-samples t-test comparing these mean gamma correlations between SPTs 
and VTs using strict grading was not significant, t(5) = 0.52, p = .63. 
 For leniently graded data used in the one-sample and paired-samples t-tests, the gamma 
correlations of recall prediction and actual recall were smaller on average for VTs (M = -0.10, 
SD = 0.34) than for SPTs (M = 0.13, SD = 0.42). A one-sample t-test showed that mean 
correlations were also not significant for VTs, t(5) = -0.75, p = .49, or SPTs, t(5) = 0.78, p = .47, 
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graded leniently. The result of a paired-samples t-test comparing these mean gamma correlations 
between SPTs and VTs using lenient grading was also not significant, t(5) = -1.12, p = .31. 
Experiment 2: Discussion 
 There were no significant differences in the results between strict and lenient grading, so 
we will again refer to only the strict grading criteria for the purposes of discussion. As there are 
only six participants included in the analyses for Experiment 2, these results should be 
interpreted with extreme caution. The only significant finding above was that JOLs made for 
SPTs were significantly higher than those made for VTs. Participants demonstrated a clear 
feeling that they would be able to recall their performed actions better than the action phrases 
they simply listened to. However, while participants did not recall performed actions 
significantly better than those they listened to, there appears to be a trend in the data favoring 
greater SPT recall. Participants had no accurate insight into which SPTs or VTs they would later 
recall. The implications of these results will be explored in conjunction with those from 
Experiment 1 in the following section. 
General Discussion 
 The following discussion will focus more heavily on the implications of Experiment 1 
than Experiment 2, due to the preliminary nature of the results of Experiment 2. Our hypotheses 
that SPTs would be recalled significantly better than EPTs or VTs is not supported by the results 
of Experiment 1 or the preliminary results of Experiment 2. This finding is both surprising and 
somewhat troubling, as there has been a wealth of previous research demonstrating the 
enactment effect (Peterson & Mulligan, 2010). Our failure to find the enactment effect in this 
experiment may call its validity into question, including the conclusions we will draw about 
JOLs in this context. However, it is worth noting that it is not unprecedented to find no 
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enactment effect in free recall. In between-subjects versions of similar experiments, subjects 
often fail to exhibit the enactment effect (Jin, 2015). This explanation is not applicable to our 
within-subjects study, but another possible explanation for the lack of an enactment effect is the 
lack of relatedness of the action phrases used. It has been well documented that action sequences, 
much like the phrases used in this study, tend to not yield an enactment effect possibly due to the 
need for more complex relational processing (Steffens, Stulpnagel, & Schult, 2015). 
 There are two potential explanations for this result in Experiment 1. First, the above 
results could have to do with the actions chosen for this study. While all SPTs and EPTs were to 
be completed within a six-second timespan, some of the actions simply do not lend themselves to 
taking the full time, while others do. For instance, the action "Drop the pencil" will inevitably be 
completed in less than six seconds, as there is no natural way to lengthen the time it takes to 
complete this action. However, the action "Play with the ball and paddle" can easily take six 
seconds, as it is more malleable in its duration.  
 Having shorter actions mixed with longer ones, even if the relevant object is presented 
for the same timespan of six seconds, could be a source of noise in the data. Encoding may be 
stronger for actions that are able to span the entire six seconds than for actions that cannot. It is 
possible that this strengthened encoding could muddle the differences between SPTs and EPTs 
by simply being more important in recall than the performed/observed distinction. As previously 
discussed, Cohen and Bryant's 1991 study found that SPTs are more sensitive to quantitative 
rather than qualitative encoding differences. This illustrates the importance of the duration of an 
SPT when attempting recall, and it is possible that EPTs adhere to a similar rule. Alternately, it is 
possible that rather than quantitative differences simply being more important in recall than 
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whether the action was observed or performed, actions that are longer in duration may strengthen 
encoding more for EPTs than for already richly encoded SPTs. 
 Another possible explanation for the lack of a difference in recall for SPTs and EPTs or 
VTs has to do with the item-by-item JOLs made by the participants. Previous research has found 
that when participants are asked to make JOLs on an item-by-item basis, typical effects (e.g., the 
perceptual interference effect) on recall are sometimes not present (Besken & Mulligan, 2013). 
Consequently, perhaps the item-by-item JOLs eliminated the usual enactment effect. There has 
not been research directly into why this occurs, but there are a couple of possible explanations. 
The first is that making JOLs directly after acquisition may strengthen the encoding of all items, 
thus increasing the EPT/VT recall level close to that of SPTs. The second is that the process of 
forming the JOLs may function as a distraction during encoding, bringing SPT recall level down 
to that which is typically seen for EPTs/VTs. Future research should be directed at assessing both 
of these possibilities by asking participants to make JOLs at the end of the study phase, rather 
than during it. 
 Results from Experiment 1 did show that there was a significant difference between JOLs 
made for SPTs and those made for EPTs, and similarly, preliminary results from Experiment 2 
showed this trend with SPTs and VTs. Participants demonstrated a clear feeling that they would 
be able to remember SPTs better than EPTs/VTs on a later memory test when asked shortly after 
acquisition. This finding supports the idea that people generally feel they have better memory for 
actions they carry out as opposed to actions they only see or hear, strengthened by the study's 
within-subjects mixed-list design. Our design helps to eliminate possible group differences that 
would be present in a between-subjects study, and the mixed list illustrates that the effect 
remains even when assessing memory for both performed and observed or performed and heard 
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actions within the same short timeframe. In contrast, a between-subjects version of a similar 
experiment found no difference in average JOLs for SPTs and EPTs/VTs (Jin, 2015). An 
explanation for this difference is that participants in within-subjects designs think more critically 
about potential differences in their memory between performed and observed/heard actions, as 
both enacting and watching/listening to actions makes this difference more salient. In between-
subjects studies, where participants are only experiencing a single condition, they may not think 
about this difference when giving JOLs. This may be another example of a variable affecting 
JOLs in a within-subjects design but not a between-subjects design, such as perceptual fluency 
(Susser, Mulligan, & Besken, 2013). 
 Results from Experiment 1 also showed that there was a significant relationship between 
predictions and actual recall with regards to EPTs, but not SPTs. In general, this means that 
participants did show success at predicting their memory for actions that they observed, but not 
for actions that they performed. The finding that predictions of recall for SPTs were not accurate 
largely agrees with the published literature (Cohen, 1983, 1988; Cohen & Bryant, 1991; Cohen 
et al., 1991). However, the participants' success at memory prediction for EPTs was somewhat 
surprising, but may have been hinted at in Cohen's 1983 paper, where participants' predicted 
recall of EPTs was slightly more accurate (though not significantly different) than of SPTs. The 
results also showed that the relationship between recall predictions and actual recall for EPTs 
was significantly different than that same relationship for SPTs. It is clear that participants do 
have some insight into their memory for observed actions, but not for actions that they 
themselves perform. This suggests that people use unique criteria for predicting their memory of 
performed actions, which appear to be unreliable when compared to criteria used to predict recall 
of observed actions or even verbal materials (Cohen, 1983). No similar trend was found between 
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SPTs and VTs in Experiment 2, but this almost certainly was a result of the tiny preliminary 
sample size. 
 Future research should focus first on replicating the well-demonstrated finding that SPTs 
are recalled at a higher rate than EPTs (and VTs, if this is not seen in the full results of 
Experiment 2). If Experiment 2 does not show the enactment effect, it may be found by making 
all actions more uniform in duration when comparing SPTs and EPTs, or by shifting away from 
the use of item-by-item JOLs. As previously mentioned, using list-end JOLs could remedy any 
issues arising from strengthened encoding across all conditions and/or distraction during 
encoding. Without showing the enactment effect, it is difficult to place confidence in the 
significantly higher JOLs for SPTs and the significant differences in prediction accuracy between 
EPTs and SPTs shown in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METAMEMORY FOR PERFORMED AND OBSERVED ACTIONS 24 
References 
Begg, I., Duft, S., Lalonde, P., Melnick, R., & Sanvito, J. (1989). Memory predictions are based 
 on ease of processing. Journal of Memory and Language, 28. 610-632. 
Cohen, L. R. (1983). The effect of encoding variables on the free recall of words and action 
 events. Memory & Cognition, 11(6). 575-582. 
Cohen, L. R. (1988). Metamemory for words and enacted instructions: Predicting which items 
 will be recalled. Memory & Cognition, 16(5). 452-460. 
Cohen, L. R., & Bryant, S. (1991). The role of duration in memory and metamemory of enacted 
 instructions (SPTs). Psychological Research, 53(1). 183-187. 
Cohen, L. R., Sandler, S. P., & Keglevich, L. (1991). The failure of memory monitoring in a free 
 recall task. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 45(4). 523-538. 
Hornstein, S. L., & Mulligan, N. W. (2004). Memory for actions: Enactment and source memory. 
 Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11(2). 367-372. 
Jin, A. (2015). The enactment effect and judgments of learning: Action memory meets 
 metamemory. Undergraduate Honors Thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
 Hill. 
McDonald-Miszczak, L., Hubley, A. M., & Hultsch, D. F. (1996). Age differences in recall and 
 predicting recall of action events and words. Journal of Gerenotology: 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 51B(2). P81-P90. 
Peterson, D. J., & Mulligan, N. W. (2010). Enactment and retrieval. Memory & Cognition, 38(2). 
 233-243. 
METAMEMORY FOR PERFORMED AND OBSERVED ACTIONS 25 
Steffens, M. C., Stulpnagel, R., & Schult, J. C. (2015). Memory recall after "learning by doing" 
 and "learning by viewing": Boundary conditions of an enactment benefit. Frontiers in 
 Psychology, 6, 1907. 
Susser, J. A., Mulligan, N. W., & Besken, M. (2013). The effects of list composition and 
 perceptual fluency of judgments of learning (JOLs). Memory & Cognition, 41(7). 1000-
 1011.  
METAMEMORY FOR PERFORMED AND OBSERVED ACTIONS 26 
Appendix 
Complete List of Ordered Action Phrases 
1. Crumple the plastic bag 19. Squeeze the hole punch 
2. Turn over the clipboard 20. Roll the dice 
3. Dial your telephone number 21. Play with the ball and paddle 
4. Place the marker upright 22. Wipe the plate 
5. Toss the jack in the air 23. Twist off the lid 
6. Press the stapler 24. Shoot the toy gun 
7. Wave the handkerchief 25. Remove a piece of tape 
8. Erase the mark 26. Insert the thumb tack 
9. Switch the light on and off 27. Balance the man on the skateboard 
10. Lift the paperclip 28. Slide the quarter into the piggy bank 
11. Pick up the napkin 29. Write your first name 
12. Pull off a post-it 30. Bounce the ball 
13. Take the cap off the pen 31. Flip the coin 
14. Push the car 32. Brush the dog 
15. Stack the pieces 33. Shuffle the cards 
16. Fold the index card 34. Drop the pencil 
17. Spray the bottle 35. Tear a ticket 
18. Draw a circle 36. Pour the water 
 
